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PRECEDENT VERSUS GRAVITATIONAL FORCE
OF' COURT DECISIONS IN BELGIUM :




L - Setting the stage
Something paradoxically happens when ,civil law' lawyers speak
about the status of court decisions. Although in many countries,
including Belgium, they do not enjoy any formal recolnition as a
source of law, ma,ny in the legal profession, incruding academics, are
referring to them as constituting binding legal ,rori*.
In this article, I wish to examine if this parad.ox can be
explained, and if so, what is, or what should be, the role played by
court decisions in the development of the law. In so doing, r will
focus mainly on the position which applies in the jurisdicttn with
which I am the most familiar, i.e. that of Belgium. rn particular,
the following issues will be examined for this po"po*", *h*t is the
basis for the authority of court decisions (seciioo rry, what is the
current state of Belgian law on this matter (section rrr) and,
finally, what should be the future direction taken by Belgium on
this subject (section IV)? The theories and opinions whiclh r will
develop in this regard are based on the position which prevails in
private law, and therefore, I do not claim that the scope of -y .orr_clusions reaches any further than this area of the law.
( I ) Professor of law, Univerrity of Antwerp: maurice.adams@ua.ac.be.
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II. - Precedent vs. $ravitational force
of court decisions : theoretical foundations
when dealing with the topic which is central to this article, ref-
erence is often made to the so-called.preced,ential force of court' deci-
sions. This term is mostly used as a kind of catch-all phrase cover-
ing two - in my opinion - conceptually separate notions' i'e-' court
d"l"i*iorr* ,, upr"""d"nts as such,r on the one hand, and what' we
might call the <gravitational forcer (2) of court decisions on t'he
otlier hand. It is therefore advisable to use the appropriate termi-
nology from the onset' In the case of force of precedent" we &re
dealirg with the formally binding nature of previous court deci-
,iorr.. hhi* is the position which applies in the majority of common
law jurisdictions. It is also sometimes expressed by means of the
phru*e stare ilecisis et quieta non nxoaere-- which can be translated
ioo*"ly as <ad.hering to what has been decided and refraining from
^ooingwhathascometorest.lThisdoctrinerequiresthat,undercertain circumst,ances, the ratio d'ec'i'd'eniJi, and only t e rati'o d'eci-
ilend,i, which is contained in a court decision - i'e., the precedent' -
must be followed in all later cases which are in relevant aspects sim-
ilar to the precedent (3). The important point is that,the doctrine
of precedeni thus constitutes a legal obligation that the precedent
be iollowed in later similar cases, and that it does not just consti-
tute a guideline. Under any legal system which is formally based on
lhe stu|e d,ec,i,sis principle, the court, decision has autho,i,tatiue for-
mality (4).
This situation should be distinguished from that which could be
described as the graaitational force of court decisions. Here, we are
dealing with a situation in which court decisions are vested with a
certain normative authority without actually making them for-
mally (legally) binding. This normative authority (and herein
r"rides the differerr"" *ith the force of precedent') is 'accepted'
rather than enforced. By this I mean that this authority is accepted
Press, 1987, ll5.
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because it is persuasive, and not simpry because it emanated from
an officially-recognised body or institution such as a court. Force of
precedent is therefore a formal phenomenon, whereas gravitational
force is a substantive phenomenon: the former relates to the form
of the court decision, whereas the latter relates to the content of it.
Moreover, force of precedent is, in practice, narrowly linked to the
facts of the case, whereas this is usually not the casl with gravita-
tional force.
Remarkably enough, given that we are dealing with two concep_
tually- different phenomena, many leading authJrs, particularly in
the field of comparative law, fail to ''"ku u terminological andsometimes eyen & conceptual distinction between these twJnotions.
The point is that these distinctions are hardly ever being taken seri-
ously. A witness in this regard is the following quotJtion, taken
from the editors of an authoritative work o" tnl subject und.er
review here:
<fP]recedent now pla11 a significant part in legal decision making
and the development of law in all the countries and legal traditions
we have reviewed. This is so whether or not precedent is officially
recognised as formally binding or merely as having other normative
force of some degree. x'or historic 
""u*onr, 
certainlegal systems for-
m_ally discourage or even discountenance the op"n 
"It"tion of prec-edents in judgments at the highest levels. But even in these cases,
precedent in fact plays a crucial role.r (5)
rn my view, the content of this quotation is misleading because
its authors use the term rprecedentr in such a, way as to"cover thetwo phenomena described above. Admittedly, both phenomena
may in practice be related and even overlap, but they remain con-
ceptually separate nevertheress. This lack of conceptual distinc-
tion is particularly problematic because the basis for the force of
precedent is different from that which underlies the gravitational
force of court decisions. And this is related to the facl that one of
these terms, gravitational force, relates to a phenomenon which
appears to be a logical necessity of any reasoning process, whereas
the other, force of preced.ent, concerns, u. -"rriiorred, a position
(5)D.N. M.a.cconurcx en R.s. suuunns, rFurther General Reflections and concrusionsr, inD N. Mrcconurcr< en R.s. sulnaens, Inrerpreting precedents: A comparatiae slray, 1""t.or1,,Aldershot, 1997, 53t-592.
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which is deliberately imposed by law' Moreover' a system based
on binding precedents as such will have to be embedded in a' par-
ticular irr*titotionul framework, which seems to a large extent
absent in many so-called civil law countries' One of my positions
isthereforethatinmanycivillawcount,ries,itwouldbeimpossi-
tt" fo" a futly il,eaelopeil legal system based on force of precedent
to even exisi. In thi last section of this article I will add a few
words on this.
A. - Counr DEcrsroNS AS PR'EcEDENTS
What, then, are the normative foundations for a syst'em of bind-
ing precedent, and why should a system of binding precedent be
introduced ?
l. - The equali,ty pri'nciple as cons'istency
Many authors have cited the equality principle as an- explanation
for the fact that court decisions actually have force of precedent' -
or in any case that they should have it' At first sight' this principle
does indeed a,ppear to present a convincing reason for adjudicating
case A2, which pr"*"rri* material similarit'ies with case Al' in t'he
same manner as Al' Karl Llewellyn explained it in the following
terms:
tToward.s its fprecedent, MA] operative drive all those phases of
human make-up- which build habit in the individual and institu-
tions in the group : laziness as to the reworking of a problem once
solved, the time and energy saved' by routine' especially under any
pressure of business; the values of rout'ine as a curb on arbitrariness
und**a,propofweakness,inexperienceandinstability;thesocial
venues of pr"ai"tubility; t'he power of what'ever exist's to produce
exfectations and the power of expectations to become normative'
Tie force of gtreceilent is heightened, by an ad,ili,ti,onal factor 
: that curi-
ous,'almosi iniuersq,l, sense of justice which urges that all men are
TtroTterly to be treated, alike in like circumstances't(6)
(6) K. Lrnwor,lvrl, r0ase Lawr, in Encyclopedia ol S-ocial Sciences' Vol 3' New York' Mac-
Millan, 1930,249 (emphasis Ji"il ert"io''ot*pi" M Moonn' tPrecedent' Induction' and
Dthical Generalizationr, in Preceilent in Lau, L Gblosrprn (ed )' Oxford' O-xfo-rd^University
Press, I98?, 186, and n. C*ot. ""iW Hennis, 
Precedent in Englisk Law'Oxford' Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1991, 3
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whether or not this expranation by Llewellyn is correct depends,
however, on what is meant here by the equality principle. prece_
dents constitute a temporal criterion, in the r"nr" of being a fixed
yardstick for the adjudication of future disputes. Therefore, if we
conceive the equality principle as one which seeks to impart tem-
poral consistency, il can definitely form a basis for giving court deci-
sions force of precedent.
But the equality principle can arso be conceived in a different
way, i.e. one which might be contrary to the temporal effect of the
force of precedent. Thus, for example, H.L.A Hart argues that the
n&rrow link between justice in judicial adjudication- on the one
lrand, and the application of a regal rule as such on the other hand,
has led some authors to treat both aspects as being one and the
same, adding:
.Yet plainly this is an error unless <rrawr is given some specially
wide meaning: for such an account of justice leaves unexplainei
the fact that criticism in the name of lusiice [i.e. ,treating like cases
alike'] is not confined to the administration of the law iriparticular
cases, but the laws themselves are often criticised as just or unjust.
Indeed, there is no absurdity in conceding that an unjust law for-
bidding the access of coloured persons to ihe parks has been justly
administered, in that only persons genuinely guilty of breaking thl
law were punished for it and then only after a fair triat.,rlZ;
Here, Hart makes a clear distinction between what we mostry
refer to as <equality before the lawr as opposed to <equality
through the lawrr. whereas the former relates to the consistent
application of legal rules in time, the second concerns the substance
and quality of the rule as such (justice as to its substance or ration-
ality). Therefore, the notion of preced.ent is non-neutral in relation
to the question as to which of the two cases constitutes the correct
decision or criterion - since it is the first-decided case which clearly
represents the criterion. It is, however, neutral in relation to the
substance of these c&ses, since it provides no information on the
degree of justice or rationarity (in the Hartian sense) which was
done in the first or in the second case.
However, the equality principre - at least within the meaning
attributed to it by Hart - is precisely neutral in principle in relation
(7)H.L.A. lJr.nr, The Concept o! Law, Oxford, Oxford University press, 1961, lS?
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to the various decisions (both the first and the second case coulil
constitutetheyardsticktobefollowed),butnotinrelationtothe
substance of these cases. If underst'ood in this way' it' would be dif-
ficultfortheforceofprecedentofcourtdecisionstohave&norma-
tive basis in the principle of equality as understood by Hart' Where
allmembersofacertaingrouphavebeensubjectedt'otreatment'
which is obviously discriminatory, a's would be the case for a rule
under which all red-haired persons on earth were t'o be subjected to
slavery, such treatment does not become any less unjust because
p"rf""t equality has been observed as between all red-haired per-
,o,,* o,' earth. In short, the precedent principle result,s in inter-tem-
poral equality, but this can be at the expense of non-temporal 
jus-
ii"u ond"" the equality principle in the second meaning described
above. Therefore, onlyifit is understood as (an element of) consist-
ency, the equality principle could be regarded as a basis for the
force of precedent, of court decisions'
2. - Legol certa'inty anil proced'ural economy
Another argument which is regularly advanced to explain the force
ofprecedent, ielates to the value oflegal certainty' In order to engage
in, for example, financial transactions, it' is necessary for the part'ies
involved to Le able to rely on a legal system which guarantees cer-
tainty.Thecaselawmustbestableinthesenseofbeinguniformand
continuous if it is to provide the necessary degree of certainty' The
link with the notion of precedent appears to be clear: where a court
is required to decide u rr"* case in the same way a's this was done pre-
viously, a system of binding precedent provides a certain- degree of
stabiliiy ani certainty. As a matter of fact, this basis for the force of
precedent of court decisions is the same as that which underlies the
consistency principle, as discussed in the previous paragraph'
KarlLlewellyn,theAmerican.legalrealist,previouslyreferred
to, has writtenihat, in addition to a number of other factors which
arecapableofexplainingtheforceofprecedent'ofcourtdecisions'
the <rlaziness as to the reworking of a problem once solvedr and the
<time and energy saved by routineu are also important considera-
tions for a system of binding preced'ent (8). Although the <laziness,l
element has negativ" oo"rton"s, it is the next phrase (rrthe time and
(8) K. LrewnllYrq, 1.c., 249.
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energy sa,yed by routiner) which teils us what Lrewellyn is referring
to here - i.e., considerations of procedural econo-y o" procedural
efficiency. rf a court was required to consider and 
"*r"** 
afresh alr
the possible outcomes of each individual case it was dealing with,
the administration of justice would become too time-consuming,
and the parties involved would have to wait too long - or should
we say, even longer - for a result. Efficient court proceedings ulti-
mately save time for both the judiciary and the parties involved.
Therefore, why not operate efficiently and follow the example of
previous similar cases? <[A] decisionmaker choosing to rely on prec-
edent may justifiably <relax,D in the sense of 
"ttgfiing iril"ss sc"u-tiny of the case. And where a rure of precedenl i"gJ* " decision-maker to relax in this sense, the net product will be a substantiar
reduction on the decisionmaking effort.I (g)
B. - The principle of reliance
The difference between the principle of reriance and that of legar
certainty as a foundation for the force of precedent of judicial deci-
sions is a subtle one, and some authors prace these two concepts
under the same heading. wasserstrom explains the difference in the
following terms:
<[r]f the failure to provide certainty might make the legal system
a less useful institution, the failure to give effect to thosJ activities
which were undertaken in justifi,eit ,iri,on", upon the pronounce-
ments of that system could serve, arguably, only to mate the sys_
tem ill-conceived, irresponsible and vicious.r (lOj
Therefore, whereas the principle of legal certainty concerns the
need- for a necessa,ry condition to be mei if the legal system is to
be able to function at alr, the principle of reliance" (or : regitimate
expectation) seeks to ensure that this condition is not infrLged in
concrete cases - and more particularly that it is not infringed once
expectations have been aroused. As is the case with legal cJrtainty,
the principle of reliance concerns the requirement that the legal
consequences of a certain action may not be subject to constant
(9)F. Scnauen, tPrecedentr, StonJorit Lau Reoiew fgg7,5gg.
^ (10]R.A.wassonsrnou,TheJudicialDecision:Towanr,aTheoryoJLegalJu"stification,stan-ford, Stenford University Press, 1961, 6?.
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change. Seen from this point of view, the principle of reliance also
offers" & re&son why court decisions should have force of precedent.
B. - GnlvrrATroNAL FoRcE oF counT DEcrsroNS :
THE ASSUIUED RATIONALITY OF COURT DECISIONS
It is interesting to note that the reasons justifying the force of
precedent of courf decisions are all of a formal nature' They provide
a reason for following court decisions, but these reasons do not' in
u''y*'yconcernthe-contentsofthecourtdecisionsinquest,ion.
ffrisfa"tidentifiespreciselythelimitsoft'heseargumentsinfavour
of a system of preced.ent i following precedent on formal grounds
"u. p"rodo." 
results which are subst,antively less satisfactory,
b""ror" the precedent might not represent justice as to its sub-
st,ance.<Tobecontentwithcertaint'yasthemajoratt'ributeist'o
demand only that result's be predictable prior to their occurrence'
Itistoleaveopenthequestionofthenatureoftheseresultswhich
are to be repeated in an orderly, ascertainable pattern' Like so
many other purely formal requirements, it can all too easily be con-
fused with those that are substant'ive'u (lI)
The principles which were dealt with above are accordingly con-
cerned with the stable operation of the law as a system' and con-
cerntheachievementofwhatx.ullerdescribesasthe<innermoral-
ity of law,r (12) i'e., a procedural morality whose acceptance
constitutesanimportant,butbynomeanssufficientconditionfor
the achievement of justice. But without a universal answer to the
question of whether stability is a good thing as. such' we cannot
decide whether decision-making according to precedent is
desirable :
<Stability may be unimpeachable in the abstract' but in reality
stability "o-"* 
Lnly by giving up some of our flexibility to explore
futly the deepest "o"t"r* 
of the events now before us' Whether this
price is worth paying will vary with the purpose to be served within
a decisional domain, and we get no closer t'o knowing those pur-
poses by understanding the relationship between stability and cat-
igori"ri size. still, focusing on this relationship is valuable, because
(ll)R.A. Wassnnsrtou, o.c., 63.
iDi ;i. ru""to, rn" i'torai;tg of Law, New Haven' Yale University Press' 1969' 
168'
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it enables us to see more clearry just how stability is achieved andjust what kind of price we must pay to obtain it; (lB)
Therefore, it seems that the arguments on which the reasons fora system of binding precedent (referred to above) rest on the
assumption that the obligation to follow court decisions will notbring about excessiye distortions. Why, then, would such an
assumption be right ? Maccormick's comments on this issue are
highly relevant here:
rr[r regard] the choice to observe formal justice in such matters as
a choice between the rational and the u,"bitrory in the conduct of
human affairs, and in asserting it as a fundam-ental principle that
buman-beings ought to be rational rather than arbitru,ry in the con_
duct of their public and social affairs (...) To somebJdy who dis-
putes that principle with me, r can indeed resort only toi Humean
argument: our society is either organized according to that value of
rationality or it is not, and I cannot contemprate without revulsion
the uncertainty and insecurity of an arbilrarily run society, in
which decisions of all kinds are settred or, *ooi"body,s whim or
caprice of the moment, without reference to past or fuiure decision
making.r (14)
This statement is clearly based on the assumption that court
decisions are deemed to have been made in a rational manner. rn
other words: judicial decisions are expected to be rational, as aresult of which it may reasonably be assumed that the reasons
which have been given earrier to arrive at a certain court decision
continue to be relevant now. The interesting thing here is that this
argumentation by Maccormick is fundamentally Jifferent from the
other arguments used in favour of precedent : tle principles of con-
sistency, legal certainty, procedo""l 
""orro-y and efficiency, andreliance, all provide an explanation as to why judicial decisions
should' haae force of precedent. But when we focus on the idea ofcourt decisions being of a rational nature, this can explain whyjudicial decisions actually do possess gravitational force. Accord-
ingly, wasserstrom is correct when he Jates that <preced.ent is, for
the case in which it was originally applied, the reason (or a reason)
(13)F. Scaeuon, rPrecedentrr, Btanloril Lau Reuiew,19g7, 602.(14)N Macconurcx, Legar Reasoiing on' Legat rheorg, oxford, oxford university press,1978, 76-77.
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qualified as <good. I Hare st'ates
given by the court for its decision'r(I5) It is here that we find' in
iry opirriorr, the essence of the gravitational force of court decisions
- i.".;in the rat'io being the ruti' In the light of this argumentation
a court decision will only be rational where it can he - inter alia -
applied in a rule-lik" **ttn",. To put it differently : rrEvery speaker
-ry ur*"rt only those value judgments or judgments 
of obligation
irrrgi""".u*"*hi.hheorsheiswillingtoassertinthesamet'erms
fo, Joury case which resembles t'he given case in all relevant
respects,ir R,. Alexy writes (16)' By advancing this argument'' refer-
urr." i, made to the universalizability theory developed by the Eng-
lishmoralphilosopherR.M.Hare'Haredefendsthetheorythatthe
principle oi onirr"rsulizability is a general principle which buttresses
moral arguments.
Hare's theory is also helpful to explain why court decisions have
gruoitttiottal force (1?), because one of the most significant conclu-
Jiorr* to be drawn from his analysis of the use of moral language 
is
t,hatthereexistsan&rrowlinkbetweend,escript'i,aeandprescriptiae
(i,e. evaluative) statements' On t'he basis of this dist'inction' two
foundationsofmoralreasoningarise:(a)theprincipleofuniuersal-
isabiti,tg and (b) the gtrescri4ttiai'ty principle' When we make the
descriptive st,atement ittut o" is red,r we must' according to Hare'
alsoacceptthateveryotherobjectwhichisidenticaltorralinall
its relevant, aspects *itt 't*o bL red' 
The st'atement <this is redr
therefore also implies the statement <everything which resembles
thisinitsrelevantaspectsisred.lAllthosewhodenythisareusing
the qualification <redu incorrectly' Hare demonstrates that this
a"gomentisvalidnotonlyinrelationtodescriptivestatements,but
*til to prescriptive stat'ements, because the latter also contain
descriptive elements' Or to put it differently : where something is
described as being <goodu this is because of a number of properties
or characteristics wh"ich are specific to it' Every other object which
possesses these properties or characterist'ics will also need to be
(tt) RAJt/"-tRsrRoM' o'c, 82 Note that Wasserst'rom uses the term 
precedent to refer to
the'gravitational force of court decisione as well'
(16) R. Arexv, A Theorv;i ;;;;l A'g;^'nt.ation' The,Theorg oJ Rational Discourse u Theorv
of L"iLi-'l-^kfiroitro, O*t*a, Oxiord Univemitv-Pt:tt: 1989' 
I90'
", 
(i?;R,.M. ii^or, trrra-o'ini'-nii"i, oxford, oxford university Press, 1963,228 p. Also
,Urii"i*rii*tif ityt, Proceeilings of tke Aristotelian Society' 1954'85' 295-312
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<we must now notice the connection between the fact that somejudgments are descriptive and another feature which it has become
the custom to call, when we are speaking of moral judgements, zzd_aersalizability.It is important to emphasize that _oru] judgements
share this feature with descriptive judgements (...).r (lg)
The fact that <ar has certain properties is therefore the reason
thy it is qualified as being .gooa., X'rom the above statement,
Hare rightly draws the conclusion that the universalizability prin-
ciple is a fundamental. principle underlying every rational reasoning
process' Accordingly, it will also be a fundumerrtal principle under-
lying legal argumentation.
<[W]hen we make a moral judgement about something, we make
rt-because of the possession by it of certain ,ron-mo"al"properties.
Thus (...) we hold that morar judgments about particular things are
made for reasons; and, the notioniy o ,"oron, as always, brings wi,thit the notion of a rure which lays down that something is a reason
for something else.r (lg)
understood in this manner, the universalizability principle, which
assumes the existence of a rule, is a theoreticat tr""Lrrity oi'tt 
" loai-cial argumentation process. court decisions shourd, in"principre, be
followed because this is assumed by the universarizabiliiy principre,
which draws on the idea of rationality. The courts u"" ,roi ailowedto argue in one direction one day, and argue in the opposite direc-
tion the next,.
Nevertheless, it should be permissibre to depart from a court
decision, because its rationality does not necessJrily apply forever,or because the quality of a decision sometimu* i*, qoitl simply,
weak' rt is precisely for this reason that the gravitatilnal force ofcourt decisions do not have the hallmark of absolute correctness (asin a system of binding precedent), but rather a TtresumTtt,ion of cor_rectness. This presumption of correctness also entails that therationality of a court decision will constantly need to be assessed(at least in marginal terms: see pa,ra,graph rv.d for more on this).rt also means that, where a court actualiy wishes to depart from ajudicial decision, the burden of proof will be on that court to dem_
onstrate that there are good grounds for this departure, which
(18) R,.M. H;enn, Freeilom anil Reason, o.c., 10.
(r9') Ibdd., 2r.
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requires, inter alia, t'hat requirements of legal certainty 
and the like
ur" to be weighed up againi its substantive requirements of 
justice'
If the gravitational force of court decisions results from the
rationality'of the judicial decision, the question nat'urally 
atises as
to why itt tft" Unitea Kingdom a formal system of binding prece-
dents has been introdu""d'"Th" reasons for this c&n' in my opinion'
only be fully understood in historical terms' In the common law' 
it
was probably because of the absence of any major codification 
until
well into the Twentieth century that a system of binding prece-
dents was introduced' (20)' It would take us too long to go into this
;-t; in any depth in this article; howevet' I wouldpoint out that
the system of precedent as such was' in England' only-formally
institutedinl8g8ontheoccasionofthecaseofLond'onTra'mways
o. Lond,on County Council' Lord Halsbury on that occasion wrote
that :
<of course I do not deny that cases of individual hardship may
arise, and there may be ' Lu""nt of 
opinion in the profession that
such and such a judgement was erroneous; but what' is t'hat 
occa-
sional interference *ith *hot is perhaps abstract' justice' as com-
pared with the inconvenien"" - ih" disastrous inconvenience - of
ilroittg each question subject to being reargued and the dealings 
of
mankind rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions, 
so that
in truth and in fact' there would be no real final court of appeal' 
My
Lords, 'interest rei publicae' is that there should be 'finis litium'
sometimeandtherecanbeno.finislit,ium,ifitwerepossibleto
suggest in each case that it might be reargued because it is 'not an
oriirru"y case' whatever that may mean'l (21)
Whether or not this is a convincing argument will be looked at
in paragraPh IV.b of this article'
(r0) O" th" h*.ry of the English system of binding precedent' see T ELLTs LowIs' 
tThe His-
rorv of Judicial precedentr, ;;:"L";,;"a;;;trrty nrri""r, 1930, 207-224 
(l) en 341 360. (I l)' l93l'
;Tr-42?iiliil;'liii-iiozii'irvi ar," r.tr'."r pr,ucxNnrr, A conci,se Histors ol the 
common
-Larl, London, Butterworth, fbf'G, i+Z-gSO and J Evans' rChanqe in the 
Doct'rine of Precedent
during the Nineteenth c""*"y], it E ""i""' ;" Lau' 
L' Gornsierrq (etl )' Oxford' Oxford Uni-
versitv Press, 198?, 35-72'""'t"ili;ntj ;; d# olt tli., eee D Pucslrv' tlondon Tramwavs (1898)r' ?lze Journal 
oJ
Legal Historg, tsso, tzz-raa'lrJ Lo*o wnrcur, rPrecedentsr, Th-e 
catnbridge Law Journal,
1944,120-122.
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III. - Does Belgian law present an obstacle
to a system of binding precedent or a system
of gravitational force of court decisions?
In this section, I will examine the applicable law in Belgium
relating to the subject of this article. The concrete question which
will be dealt with is the folrowing one: is there anything in Bergian
positive law which (a) obstructs or (b) promotes a system of force
of precedent or gravitational force?
A. - Anrrcr,n 6 on rnn Bnr,crRN Conn
or Crvrr, Pnocnounn
The Belgian courts are not allowed to make decisions bv means
of general disposition. Article 6 of the Belgian code of civil proce_
dure leaves little doubt on this issue: <The courts may not, in the
disputes submitted to them for judgment, make any decision by
way of general disp_ositions quarifying as a rule.r This provision
restates Article b of the n'rench cod,e ciail, which 
"orr*iitot"d "reaction against the powers of the parrements, which they acquired
under the Ancien Rdgime, to issue, in their capacity o'f *op"",,r"
courts, so-called arr\ts d,e rigrement. These arrhts iot only applied to
the concrete disputes which were settled by them, but, in th" ,"_u
wa,y as legislation, were also aimed at the future and had an erga
omnes effect. In general terms, they were made wheneyer an issue
arose which gave rise to a new legal problem(z2).
-There 
currently exist hardly any direct infringements of Article 6
of the Belgian code of civil procedure. The 
""Lorrr"" of this pro-vision results mainly from a number of indirect infringements : the
courts may not, in a formal sense, regard themselies as being
bound by the previous case law, not even by the decisions of the
Supreme Court, since by so doing they would attribute to the case
law a general rule-like scope. Because of this rure, the Belgian legal
system does not allow a system based on the binding forcr of prec-
edent - i.e., a system under which court decisions mist be followed
(22)on this, eee: Panilectes Berges,rx, vo tArrdt de rdglementr, en vIII, vo rApplication dela loir, nrs.?-22; x'. or,rvlEn-Memrrv, diclojre du ir,roit francais: des origines d la lriaoru.rion,Paris, Dom_at Montchrestien,. 194g, bgg and p. Brlmr, rservitudes et rit"jes ae ;rge,ies articles4 et 5 du Code Civil Frangaisr' in Argunents il'auroriii et arguments il,e raison en ilroit,p. yrs-sART e.&. (ed.), Brussel, Nemesis, lggg, l45_15g.
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(23) Article 23 of the Article of the Belgian Code of
because they have once been ma'de' I[owever' Article 6 does not 
in
uny *ty foim un obst,acle to a syst'em based on gravitational force'
asiong as the court, applies the findings of an earlier judicial deci-
sion ii a reasoned *uy. ttt"t"fore, t'he reasons advanced by the
court when deciding " "u*" 
may not include that it was decided in
a fr"ti"olur way bicau," anot'her court had previously 
made the
same judgment,. The court may, however, state that it followed an
earlier d.ecision because it considered that judgment t'o be a sound
and rational decision. In so doing, the court' may even make express
reference to previous court decisions'
In this sense, Article 6 has evolved from an application of the
principle of separation of law and politics - i'e'' the idea that the
ioort. -uy or,iy apply the law rather than make it' - towards 
a dis-
guised obiigation to give re&sons' In its current' applicat'ion' it
t,hereforehasanarro*"ti''t.withArticlel4goftheBelgianConsti-
tution, which also contains a provision imposing the duty to give
reasons for judicial decisions' Viewed in this light' Article 6 may
even have a meaningful role to play today'
B' - Anrrcln 23 or rHE BELGTAII Coln
on Crvrr, Pnocnlunn : RES JUDTcATA




b" u ,"qoirement that ihe case to be decided is the s&me' that the
claimhasthesamec&use,thattheclaimisinstitutedbetweenthe
same parties, and that it has been brought by them and against
them in the same caPacit'Y'ri
The object of this provision is to achieve that one and the same
concreteclaimwillnotb"broughttoacourtatthesamehierarchi-
cal level more than once - res iud',i,cata pro uer,i,tate habetur. There-
fore, once a court has mad,e a decision in a specific case' that deci-
sion can no longer be challenged by a judicial body of the same or
of a lower level izg). The object of this provision is to prevent 
a spe-
cific lawsuit from taking an eternity to be decided'
any appeal Procedure.
Civil Procedure of coune does not prevent
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_ The late Belgian schorar Kruithof has expressed the view that
both the letter and the spirit of Article eg or tne Belgian code ofcivil Procedure would - 'i,nter ari,a - constitute an obstacle to the
force of precedent and even to the gravitationar force of court deci-
sions(24). I do not share this view. The res juilicata doctrine essen_
tially has little to do with the subject-matter und.er discussion in
this article. I can see at reast three points of difference between the
res jud"icata doctrine on the one hand, and the doctrine of force of
precedent or gravitational force on the other (2b).
Res juilicata relates, first, to the decision made in a specific case,
whereas the force of precedent and gravitational fo"c" oi court deci-
sions relates to the more general legal consideratio ns - ratio d,eci-ilenili - which follow from a judiciar decision. precedent and gravi-
tational force thus reach further when compared to the doctrine of
res jud,icata. Secondly, res jud,,i,cata merely applies to the parties
involved in a concrete dispute and their heirs,-whereas the force of
precedent and gravitational force of a decision has, in principle, an
effect' erga omnes. x'inaily, substantiar res judicata enters into effect
as from the moment when the decision was made (see Article 24 of
the Belgian code of civil proced.ure), but the latter only acquires
formal res jud,icato once the decision is no longer capable"of judicial
review or appeal (see Article 2g of the Belgian code of civil proce-
dure)' The force ofprecedent and gravitational force ofa court deci-
sion, on the other hand, wilr in principre enter into effect immedi-
ately, i.e. as from the time when the iatio d,eci,d,end,i was stated.
C. - Anrrcr,ns 84 alrn IBB
oF THE Bnr,craw Consrrrutrow
The doctrine which seeks to exclude the courts from taking part
in lhe rule-making process, i.e., the separation of powers, may alsofind confirmation in two provisions or tnu Bergian constitution:
Articles 84 and 144, which state that it is only J statute or decree
which may provide an authentic (i.e. generaily binding) interpreta-
tion of a legislative instrument, According to the spiritlf these con_
stitutional provisions, it is the author orlhe legisLtion who is best
(24) R,. Knurrnor, rNaar een 'Gouvernement des juges, in het Belgische yerbintenissen_recht{r,^in Hulde-aan pro!. dr' R. Kruith.o!, AntwerpeniBrusser, Maklu/Biuytrnt, i-gbz, ro-sa.(25) Compare R.W.M. Dres, Jurispmdince, London, Buttemorths, tggb, 126_127.
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placed to interpret it. Eius est legem -i-nterpretari' 
cujus est conilere'
i, u ,onruqo"ri"", the judiciary would be barred from any partici-
pation in the rule-making process'
The courts are obviously bound to act in accordance with an
interpretative statute, even where the interpret'ation made by stat-
ute or d.ecree goes against earlier int'erpretation by the courts' Arti-
cle Z of the Belgian dode of Civil Procedure therefore states that the
courts are bound. to <act in accordance with the interpretative Laws
where definitive ruling has not' been given on a point of law at the
time when these inteipretative Laws had become binding'r How-
ever, this amounts t'o no more t'han confirming the supremacy of
i"gi*i"tion within the Belgian legal system, rather than acknowledg-
irrlg thut court decisions have no part to play in this system'
D. - AppnaLS, APPLToATToNS To rrrE Supnnun Count'
AND .SUPR,EME COURT R,EVIEW IN THE LEGAL INTEREST,
As we have just seen, a system of binding precedent is not pos-
sible in Belgium. However, i1 is possible to find in Belgian positive
law a numblr of provisions - i.e- provisions which allow the possi-
niUty ,o appeal a decision in a higher court and with applications
to the Sopi"-" Court', i.e. provisions that can be found in virtually
any jurisiiction in the wes[ern world - from which it might be con-
cluded that the Belgian legal system seeks to promote the supposed
rational unity of the sysi"m. In more concrete terms this means
that, where mistakes trrd unomtlies in t'he legal system exist' either
actually or potentially (for example, because previous court deci-
sions are ,tol b"itg followed), these provisions provide inst'it'ution-
alised opportunitiJs to remove such problems from t'he system'
Viewed in ttti* light, all these provisions are based on the notion
thatthelegalsystemseekst,oachieveorconsolidateitsrationality'
To this extent these provisions share the consequences of the way
in which we &ssess the value of judicial decisions'
x.urthermore,t,heinst,itutionofsuTlremeCourtreaiewintheinter.
ests of the law provides, in my opinion, even clearer evidence of the
fact ihat the legislature has sought to acknowledge the implications
of the need for rationality in the legal system' X'rom Article 1089
of the Belgian code of civil Procedure itself, the objectives of t'his
p"oc"dore-clearly emerge' i'e', to wit the promotion of legal unity:
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<Decisions made at last instance which are contrary to the rele-
vant laws or procedures, and against which ,ron" oi the parties
applied for review within the statutory time limit, shall be chal-
lenged er officio before the Supreme Court by the State
Prosecutor. rr
This provision has introduced the possibility of supreme court
review even when the parties involved have failed to appry for it.
s-uch a review is purely dogmatic, and will only be pro'ntunced in
the interests of the law and its future observance. Ariicle l0gg may
only be relied upon when no further judicial remed.y is availabre to
the parties. This provision therefore is intended to be an instrument
which seeks to discourage undesirable court decisions in the future
and to prevent the_courts from being influenced by a theory which
has been accepted by a certain body of court declsions. viewed in
this light, court decisions which are the result of 'supreme court
review made in the interests of the law' can to a certain extent be
expressly regarded as precedents (26). That the significance of this
p_rovision is purely dogmatic also emerges explicitry from the fact
that the parties involved may not rely on an Article l0gg review in
order to be exempted from the rulings contained in the annulled
decision.
However, one might argue than an action seeking Supreme Court
review on the basis of Article l0gg of the Belgian coae or civil pro-
cedure will not be based on &n infringement of the relevant case
law, but on the violation of a concrete Iegislative provision, because
it is the latter - the significance or scope of which had been misap-
plied in a court decision - which is the iormally binding instrument.
This fact illustrates one of the limitations of Articte todg or the Bel_
gian code of civil Procedure, for if a judicial decision is not based
on a legislative provision, this procedure cannot be applied. Never-
theless, it is in a court decision itself that a rule finds concrete sig-
nificance.




tsoo, t5. paradoxically, this pro-cedure leads in effect to so-called 
1m1c1s d9 rdglementi, *tri"rr i-t"l rti.l".i"Ji.i"t "r "i"*were the main reason why Article 6 of the Belglan Code of Civil Procedure was introduced. Seefootnote 25 end accompanying text.
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IV. - Towards a culture of $ravitational force
of court decisions
Should a system based on the force of precedent' or on-gravita-
tional force aiso be introduced in Belgium ? The &nswer t'o this ques-
tionshoulddependatleastinpartonwhet'herornot'courtdeci-
sions are followed up in fact' In any case, I am convinced that' if
compliance with court decisions is an outward expression of the
rationality of a legal system, it is in general not desirable that
authoritaiive and rational case law should not' be followed'
A' - X'oncn oF PREcEDENT
AND GRAVITATIONAL FORCE IN PRACTICE
Remarkably enough, the operation in practice of- a system of
precedent or eYen grl,vitation'l fo""" has hardly ever been t'he sub-
iect of an in_depttr*study as such. An interesting 
example of this is
a collection of essays on thi* topic which has already been referred
to, i.e. InterTtret'i,ng preceilents ' A Co^p*ratiae 
Btuily' edited by
o.N. wtaccormick utra R,.S. Summers. I would at this point rest'at'e
theconcludingsentencesofthisstudy(whichhasalreadybeencit'ed
in the introduction of paragraph II of this article) :
<[P]recedent now plays a significant part' in legal decision making
urra tt 
" 
development oi law in all the countries and legal traditions
we have reviewed, This is so whether or not precedent is officially
recognized as formally binding or merely as having other normative
forcJ of some degree. x'or historic reasons, certain legal systems for-
mallydiscourageorevendiscountenancetheopencitationofprec-
ederri, in judgments at the highest levels' But even in these cases'
precedent in fact plays a crucial role'r (27)
This conclusion is remarkable, because I believe it is impossible
to make such an empirical observation on the basis of the analysis
performedbythetttu,ttycontributorstot'hatcollectionofessays:
thereisnotonecontributionwhichexaminescompliancewithcourt
decisions in concrete t'erms, i'e', empirically on the basis of studying
P4DNj{**RMIoKenR.S'suuuons,tFurtherGeneralR'eflectionsandConclusioner'in
D.N. MacConurcr en R.S S,r""t"", f"f"ereting Preceilents: A Comptaratiae Studg' 
Dartmouth'
Aldemhot, 1997, 531-532. On this book alio M''Aorus' <The Rethoric of Precedent 
and Com-
p""rii"" i"g"f R"."a""hr, The Moilern Low Reuiew' 1999' 464-468'
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expressly the way in which court' decisions a,re followed up in a par-
ticular area of the law.
MacCormick and Summers appear to conclude that when, for
example, the highest judicial authority, such as the Belgian
supreme court, frequently follows its own case raw a system of
precedent exists (or, for that matter, a system of gravitational
force). rn fact, it would be a somewhat sorry state of affairs if this
were not the case. But the crucial thing which has to be observed
when drawing conclusions on whether court decisions have gravita-
tional or eyen precedential effect, is to what extent rational case
law penetrates through the whole legal system. The work by Mac-
cormick and summers is based mainly on the observation that the
decisions of the highest courts are followed by the highest courts
themselves.
x'inally, r would like to mention that r myself carried out an
analysis such as the one advocated above in relation to three areas
of the Belgian law of torts. My conclusion at the time was that the
gravitational force of court decisions was not in the best of health
in these areas (28). The reason for this situation appeared to reside
in the indifferent level of the reasons given by ttre netgiun courts
for their decisions (2g), and the absence of a satisfactory" system of
case law reporting. These are in my opinion also the two necessary
conditions which must be fulfilled for a system based on the force
of precedent or the gravitational force of court decisions to have a
_"|"t^g" of flourishing. viewed in this right, the conclusions drawn by
Maccormick and summers are improbable, because many of the
legal systems which were looked upon in their collection of ess&ys
seem to lack these institutional preconditions.
B. - Wner rs nnqurnen ?
What, then, do we need in Belgium ? Would it be wise to intro_
duce a system of binding precedent, based on the stare d,ecis,i,s
(28) M' ADAMS, rlaw ie es.I've told you beforet, TijiltchriJt aoor Priuaatrecht lg9?, l357-lggr.(29) This conclusion elso results from a iew order studiJs by tire swiss scholar A.o. Germann, whoproves that in switzerland there exists-a strong relotion b"t*""r, the way 
"ou"ts 
gioe r""soos fo"their decisions and a system of preredent or lravitationar force. A.o. br"ro"*] ui.u;udizieleTragweite hochetinstanzlicher Urteile, inibesondere der Urteile dee schweiserischen
Brrndesgerichtsr, zeitschrift Jar Bchueizerieches Recht rs4g,2g7 rr2 en 428-456; liiu, rraiu-iliz'ien als Recktaquelle: edne Btudie zu den Methoden der Rechtsjinduzg, stockhorm, Armqvist,1960, 52 p and roou, Durch die Juitikatur Erzeugte Rechtsnormen, ziirich, schultes, 1976, 86 p.
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principle? I would not be in favour of doing this' for a variet'y of
reasons.
Thefirstteasonisthat,iftherationalnatureofacourtdecision
brings out its gravitational force, as I have argued' it is not neces-
*rr/fo, court-decisions to be absolutely binding (which is not to
deny the need for a certain culture in which explicit use is made of
courtdecisions,whichwillbed.iscussedbelow).Iwouldendorsethe
comment, by Lord Wright in 1944, who himself was a judge in the
House of Lords (which in 1944 was not even prepared to overrule
its own precedents) :
<r(...) on balance of social convenience and public welfare it would
havebeenbettertohaverefusedtoperpetuate[an]erroneousand
unjust rule. An occasional re-argument of [a] rule is a small mat'ter
"o*pur"d 
with the persistent operation of injustice'r (30)
However,independentlyoft'heseconsiderations'andinthesec-
ondinstance'eYenasystemofbindingprecedentscannotprovide
a guarantee that judicial decisions will be followed with precision'
In fact, it can actually give rise to a great degree of confusion as a
result, of the practice tflverdistinguishing' A good exa]nple of this
is the way irr which, in the nineties of the Twentieth Century' the
English law developed on the subject of awarding damages for so-
catled(pureeconomiclossri-i'e',financiallosswhichdoesnot'
result from personal injury or damage to property (31)' This' I
believe, has shown that, when dealing with a field in which some
court decisions are generally felt to be unsatisfactory, a system of
binding precedents can have a highly confusing effect' In any case'
until the late 1990s this area of the law was governed by a some-
what incoherent set of rules displaying, amongst others' an unclear
relationship between the contractual and non-contractual law on
theawardofdamages'Distinguishingoftenbringsrelieftosuchsit-
uations, and has proved to be a way of eluding an undesirable prec-
(30) L""t W-r*tr, <rPrecedentsr, The Cambriilge Law Joumal lg44'122' See also the critical
comments by Lonn nut*roo, ini Cou't "t lei:4in 
England' London' Athlone.Press' 1950'
l?_Ig and Lono Conou, *.rr"ifii"tion,pr""ti"" "rid 
Procerlure in the Court of Appealr, The Cam-
bridge Law Journal 1951, ll'
(31)On this: J. Sterr-rrorl, rDuty of Care-and Economic Loss: a Wider Agendar' 
The Law
Quarterly Reuiew,1991, z+a-t;ft io"t", tln Restraint-of Tortr' in The Frontiers 
of Li'ability'
P.Brer<s (ed.), Oxford, OxfoJunivemiiy Press, 1994' 83-102' and lonu' tDuty 
of care: Periph-
eral Parties and Alternative Opfo'tttitiJs for Deterrencer' The Lau Quarterl'g Reuiew' 
1995'301-
345.
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edent, although this naturaily creates tensions with the official
English doctrine of precedent. At the same time however, too much
distinguishing can also create confusion in the law.
Thirdly, f am unwilling to advocate a system of binding prece_
dents because the quality, i.e. the ratio, of a precedent is ntt fixed
in advance. rn practice, court d.ecisions hao" ,ro independent value
in time regardless of their substantive quality, and the existence of
a judicial decision may be an authoritative, but not a decisive, rea-
so-n for making the same decision as before. rn this sense, the scope
of a decision should not be fixed in advance. This viewpoint is arso
consistent with the argument raised previously, that court decisions
should merely contain a presumpti,on of correctness.
what I would argue for however, is a culture whereby the courts
make express use of judicial d.ecisions. This would not make for a
system of binding precedent, but would entail that judiciar deci-
sions are expressly involved in the process of judicial reasoning. rf
the law can, next to other things, be described as a curture of argu-
mentation - and there are some reasons for doing so - the debateon the best or the most rationar solution to a legal dispute shourd
be erplici'tly based on well-argued and clearly J"p""**"d re&sons,
including a discussion on the rational nature of rerevant previous
court decisions. The grounds of judgment of a decision shourd ulso
serve a,s an instrument for determining the contents of a rule, as
developed by the courts.
x'rom this perspective, it is remarkable that the Belgian supreme
court neyer cites previous court decisions, even though this would
not be contrary to Article 6 of the Belgian code of ciiil procedure.
on the other hand, and contrary to the Bergian supreme court,
the lower Belgian courts do occasionalry make i"f""un* to previous
decisions; however, one has the impression that this is done mainry
for confirmation purposes, and therefore to substantiate a decision.
However, a more systematic use of judicial decisions in the court,s
grounds of judgment shourd entail that the court is using the case
law both to confirm and to challenge it.
C. - Tnn DUTy ro GIVE REAsoNs
fn paragraph IV.A I wrote that one of the main reasons why a
system ofprecedent or even gravitational force cannot function sat_
68 MAUR,ICE ADAMS
isfactorily in Belgium is that the courts generally do nlt elaborate
ingioing"eu*ottr-fortheirdecisions'CourtdecisionsinBelgiumare
-oitty 
"presented &s misleading syllogisms' Still' th: question
,"-ui'rn as to under what circumstances courts' grounds of judg-
ment should be more comprehensive ? (32) And this quest'ion is rel-
evant, here because there are certainly no reasons why these
grounds of judgment should be more comprehensive or elaborate in
ill 
"ir"ornrtut""*. 
This would be unrealistic in view of the practical
conditions in which t'he courts in Belgium make their decisions -
there are ma,ny hundreds of thousands of decisions per year' But'
above all, I am convinced that the majority of cases present no
problems,sinceanad,equateknowledgeoftherelevantlegislation'
.ur" lu*, and academic writings would suffice to enable a court to
make a decision which is understood and accepted by the legal com-
munity. It is unnecessa,ry in these circumstances to search through
tfr" 
"mir" 
gamut of legai decision-making techniques and set them
outbefore-thereaderbeforearrivingatadecision(33).
However,somec&Sesarenotproblem-free'noraretheirsolutions
obvious, in which situations t'he courts' grounds of judgm^ent will
need to be more comprehensive' For example' the nature of t'he rel-
evant law and legal tr"* -ty require grounds of judgment which
are more comprehensive. In c,i-inal law, for example' where people
are frequently convicted with imprisonment, the demands in regard
to the g.oond. of judgment have to be spelled out in detail' Also'
where i court decision is of a radical n&ture' or has a definit'ive
character,thecourts'account.abilitytowardsthepartiesinvolved
willbegreaterthanwherethisisnotthecase'Abriefsyllogismwill
be inadlquate, and the applicable legislation and case law will need
to be interpreted in a Yery concrete and express manner' AIso' the
procedural context cun b" relevant' for the extent and contents of
in" aoty to give reasons. Thus, the reasons provided in summary
pro""eding* will nor-ally be less extensive than those provided as
a result, of a full trial'
To the extent that the legal solution of a particular problem has
become widely accepted, the court will have little difficulty in align-
-(Bz) 
o" thi. rl." J.B.M. vneNrrn, Algenteen Dee-l II, in Mr'c'Asser's Hanitrleiding tot de
ulq*i"i ,r, i"i-wraa.,"ar^'i"rirtiit hecht, zwotre, Tjeenk willink, 1995, 56 n.r2, r4r'r42
en 148-156.
(33) Ibid., 57
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ing its grounds of judgment on this solution : court decisions which
confirm a certain state of affairs in a non-controversial area of the
law may content themselves thus with a less comprehensive set of
reasons' The contrary will obviously appry where this is not the
case. In such cases, the court's grounds -oi lodg*unt wilr need to
enhance the degree.of acceptability of a decision] x'inaily, when the
court takes a decision which contributes towards the development
of the law, its grounds of judgment will obviousry need to be more
comprehensive. Developing the law can take various forms: filling
voids left by gaps or by the vagueness or open nature of rules, or
am-ending, adjusting, or sharpening the interpretation of case lawand legislation. The court must expressly elaborate, and give
express reasons for, newry developed rules. when the status quo is
maintained in a controversial area of the raw, the court wil also
have to elaborate on their judgment and explain why it chose notto opt for a change in the law.
D. - RnpnESENTATTvE couRT DEcrsroNs
rf we are to have a regal culture in which court decisions play a more
visible and significant rore, either in a system of precedent or mere
gravitational force, it is a precondition that these decisions are actually
available for consultation. rt is difficult to see how unpublished judicial
rulings can play a role in the development of the law. Obviously, where
case law merely involves routine decisions, the fact that a cou"t deci-
sion is not published does not give rise to insuperable problems in this
regard' However, where a particular decision adds something to our
knowledge of the law, this will definitely be the case.
rn lgg4 storme pointed out that of the b00,000 decisions which
*"-":. T"gu annually in Belgium at the time, barely one percent was
p-ublished (3a). By themselves, these figures amount to no more
than a fact which presents very little normative significance. How-
ever, Storme added that, in his view, the publish-ed case law was
not representative. such a state of affairs is of course not desirable.
Since 1994, we haye seen & lot of change. X.or example, an annual
report, which has already been referred. to, is issued by the Belgian
supreme court' rn it, the court indicates which of its decisions
(34)M. Sronue, tRecht,gp.TIt Overpeinzingen van de directeur y&n een juridischtijdschriftr, in reestbundetr J0 jiar Tijitschrt\ ioo, eiroolrecrr, Brusser, story-scientia, 1994, x.
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were, in the court's opinion, of significance' However' this develop-
ment does not solve utt p'oUl"m* in this regard' In the-course of
2004, for example, the Supreme Court issued no fewer than 2'900
decisions. Although it woutd make sense to publish them a'll' this
being a precondition if comprehensive public monitoring is to be
m"dl po.sible, it is at leasi as important that there should also
existanindependentandauthoritativepublicationwhichconsti-
tutes a reTtresintatiae collection of case law' And this is so because 
a
fullcollectionofnon-replesent,ativecourt,decisionscouldcausea
great deal of uncertainty and confusion'.To put it differently : t'here
can also be too *u"h ci's" law published' which would result in the
loss of a clear view on the relevant' cases'
Itwouldalsobeimportanttohaveapublicationwhichprovides
alimitedandrepreserrt*tio"pict'ureofthelowercourt'decisions'
Even though the decisions of lh" hlghu" courts (in particular those
of the Sup-reme Court) are those which in practice will play an
authoritat'ive part in the development of the law' it is crucial to be
able to consuli the other court decisions a,s well, since the latter 
are
capable of setting off new trends, and can show the ext'ent to 
which
thiy have accepted the case law of the higher courts'
E. - Wnnu AR'E TrrE couR'TS ALLowED
TO DEPART FROM JUDICIAL DSCISIONS?
Mencrner, ASsESsMENT As A soLUTroN
Becausethereisachancethat'courtd'ecisionsareirrational'it
must be permissible t'o depart' from them (overruling)' However' 
t'he
stability of the legal ,y*i"- requires at the same t'ime that court
decisions are not disregarded too easily' Whether or not a decision
shouldbeoverruledw-illthereforeneedtobeassessedbycriteria
other than merely those of rationality' This fact confers a special
character on the question as to t'he circumstances under which a
court d.ecision may be departed from'
On this question, it is interesting to consider the position in Eng-
landwhere,"o"r*in."thewell-knownPracticeStatementof1966'
the House of Lords became the only court capable of overruling 
a
decision of its own (35)' It upp"tt* that' as far as the House of
(35)Practice Btaternent (Judicial Preceilenl)' U9661 I WLR 1234,
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Lords is concerned, the mere fact of a precedent being incorrect
does not constitute a decisive reason for departirrg froir a prece-
dent (36)' More has to be involved for this to happJrr. r., more con-
crete terms, an overruling should also contribute towards a net
improvement in the law, and the new decision must, in principle, be
based on different grounds from those of the oo"rrolud decision.
Accordingly, the House of Lords will not, in principle, proceed to
overrule a decision where the reasons which 
""" 
udourr"ed'to justify
the new decision are the s&me as those which were used in order to
arrive at the earlier decision. This will be the case where nothing of
importance in the earlier decision had been disregarded in the ofin-
ion of the House, and where the context and the social conditions
in which the precedent was created remain the same. Even if the
current judges of the House of Lords are of the opinion that the
precedent was incorrect, this is, according to this criterion, no more
than evidence of the existence of two different opinions on the mat-
ter. This viewpoint appea,rs to assume that, since opinions on pre_
cisely-what is a good judgment differ, the doctrine of precedent
should institutionalise a preference for formal values suci as regar
certainty, consistency, procedural economy, reliance, etc.
It seems that the fear experienced by the House of Lords is that,
if the_conditions specified above were not set, the relevant d.ecisions
would merely be subjected to an assessment as to their fairness orrationality, with the possible consequence that in the end only a
collection of ad, hoc decisions wourd remain, and the principle of
legal certainty would be infringed upon drastically. This reasoning
was also to be found in the opinion proffered by Lord wilberforce
in Fi,tzleet Estates Ltd, u. Cherry (Insptector of Tires) :
<rNothing could be more undesirable, in fact, than to permit riti-
gants, after a decision has been given by this House with all
a'ppearances of finality, to return to this House in the hope that a
differently constituted committee might be persuaded to take the
view which its predecessors rejected. (....) rt requires much more
(36) J'w Hennrs' rTowards,prin-cipres of overruring - when should a Final court of Appearsecond Guess?), oxford Joumar.o! Legar stu.ies, rgs'irsr rss and B.v. Hannrs, rFinal appel-
lut" "lo"lr overruling their own 'wron!' precedert* th" orgoirg search for principrer, Law euar-terlg Retiew, 2002, 408-427.
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than doubts as to the correct'ness of such opinion to justify depart'-
ing from it.r (37)
Reasonable as the crit'eria used by the House of Lords to justify
distinguishing from a previous case seem to be' t'he question still
,emaii* wheiher all this requires a system of binding precedent for
all the courts but the House of Lords' Would the most important'
consideration underlying a strict and all pervasive :y*t-9*.of 
bind-
ing precedents, i.e. "*tntti*ttittg 
legal stability' be radically infringed
op"on if courts in general, *o ,tot just the House of Lords' would not
be tied to a system of binding precedent ? In 1944' when the prac-
tice of overruling was not yui offi"i"Ily permitted for the House of
Lords itself, Lord Wright was already downplaying t'he argument of
t"gui "".t"inty 
used tJ justify rigid adherence t'o a system of stare
ilecisis '.
<There need. be no fear that the whole system of precedents would
bedestroyedifthischange[i'e.gettingridofbindingprecedent]
were so made. The instinJt of inertia is as potent in judges as in
other people. (..') No Court will be anxious to repudiate a prece-
dent.Itwilldosoonlywhenitiscompletelysatisfiedthattheprec.
edent is erroneous' t...) ff the Court is so sat'isfied' it is a humili-
ation which ought not' to be put upon it' to reproduce and perpet-
uate the "rror. f...; 
Precedents would still be precedents' though not
coercive but, merely persuasive' If that lilere so' it may further be
noted that there could not be the same urgency t'o carry to
extremes the process of distinguishing from t'he t'hen present case
erroneous Precedents.r (38) (39)
IaminclinedtosidewithLordWright.Thefirstre&sonforthis
is that, in present-d,ay English practice, undesirable precedent's are
too frequenily distinguished indeed' specifically by the lower court's'
which resutts in legafuncertainty. paradoxically enough, this serves
to go against the main consideration (i'e' t'o create legal stability
(37) tI9?71 3 Atl ER 959.
(38) Lono WRrcur, 1.c., 144'
iigiN";""h"f"r., i. u d""i"io, issued in 2001 the House of Lords 
in its judicial capacity
aeems once again to rrr"" ""rrnlln"a 
trrai it 
"ontinr"s 
to adhere to the strict store decisis doctrine
(exceptforitself).Thea""i.i**''-'debyfiveLawf,orils,threeofwhomwereoftheopinion
that the precedent on which lir" a"Ji." w"as ultimately based was incorrect. However, 
of those
three juilges, two were .f il," "p-i"i""1hut 
th" d".irioo in question was nevertheless binding The
moin reason for this appears ;;;;t" been once again that legal certainty is endangered 
where
the mere incorrectness or n p"e"",le.t would be sufhcient ""u.o-r 
to proceed -to an overruling see
n.r. Xonr.t (No.z), [2001] i Wln Wtz' On this B'Y HeRnrs' l c" 409-410
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and certainty) which is used in order to advocate a strict doctrine
of binding precedents for all the courts besides the House of Lords
in its judicial capacity. More importantly, and secondly, there is a
method which c&n serve the cause of legal stability wiihout ending
in the cramped and, in my view, far too conservative attitude of
the House of Lords. My proposal is that the method of what we
might call 'marginal assessment' courd be a major tool in making
possible a quality check of judicial d.ecisions, thereby adhering to
considerations of legal certainty without at the *u^" ti-" getting
rid of the need to have the law evolve adequately. When applying
this method, the court merely examines whether the decision in
question could reasonably (taking into account all the interests
involved) have brought about a certain resurt. only if on that basis
the court decision appears to be unreasonable, sirould it be sub-
jected to a full examination as to the quality and rationality of its
contents. Marginal assessment, thus entails a presumption of ration-
ality - which then gives rise to a presumption of coirectness of the
court decision under review - as long as its irrationality or unfair-
ness is not too obviously on display. The presumption of correctness
coupled with a marginal assessment procedure will entail a <benefit
of the doubt. r In the end, this method merely examines whether
certain limits, which_ are part of any concept of rationality, have
not been exceeded. ultimately, the method of marginal assessment
takes into account that there exist severar conceptlons of a certain
legal proposition that are perceived to be correct or rational. rn
concrete terms, this entails that for a specific court not to share the
opinion of another court this does not constitute evidence of the
<tclear irrationalityr of the court decision in question.
x'rom this point of view the notion of <clear irrationalityr is the
conception of rationality which can no longer be recognis"i a, so"h
in the light of every other reasonable conception of ralionality. This
means that the rationality criterion ur *o"h is an ambiguous source
of good or correct law (what is rational law?), that can-nevertheress
serve as a criterion of assessment. rn other words, the notion of
rationality is a concept which can be subject to different concep_
tions as to its contents; at the same time, although different con-
ceptions of rationality exist, debating the quality oi a court decision




ised as follows :
l.Thecentralquestionofthisarticleis:Whatroleshouldjudi.
cial decisions play in the development of the law ? This question is
relevant because something remarkable is going on when debating
the status of court decisions in many civil law countries' Although
in many countries, including Belgium, hardly any official or- formal
r""ogrriiion is given to court decisions as & source of law' Iawyers
are ieferring to them in a way which suggests that they do have
Uinaing forJe. Can this paradox be explained' and if so' how ?
2. A distinction must, be drawn between the so-called force of
preced,entofcourtd'ecisionsontheonehand'andtheirgrauitati'onal
'jorrc on the other hand. In the case of force of precedent' we are
healing with the formally binding nature of previous court deci-
sions. 
"This 
is the position as it prevails in the majority of common
law jurisdictions. The re&sons in favour of the force of precedent
1"on*i*t"rr"y, legal certainty, procedural economy 
and efficiency'
and reliance) are all formal by nature in that they provide re&sons
for complying with court' decisions in time' They have' howeYer' no
bearing on the contents ofthese decisions as such' The gravitational
forc" o1 court decisions is based on the rationality of the court deci-
sionassuch(i.e.thequalityofthecourtdecision).Viewedinthis
tigttt,rft"gravitationutfo"""ofcourtdecisionsfollowslogically
fr"om the rationality of the court decision' and gives rise to a pre-
sumption of the correctness of the court decision'
3. There is nothing in Belgian positive law which formally pre-
vents the gravitatioial force of court decisions, although force of
precedent is not allowed. There are, however' a number of provi-
*iot, - more particularly provisions relating t'o appeal proceedings'
applications io the nlbiu" Supreme Court' and t'he so-called
'supremeOourtprocedureintheinterest'softhelaw'-whichindi-
cate that the Belgian legal syst'em in theory militates in favour of
thegravitational-ro,."orcourtdecisions.Theseprovisionsdonot
go ,o fr" as expressly confirming a syst'em of gravitat'ional force'
but they do point in the same direction'
4. In Belgium, there is no need for a system of binding prece-
d.ents. There is, however, a need for a culture in which court deci-
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sions ar_e expressly used. This is a culture in which the gravitationar
force of court decisions is recognised in fact, and in "which court
decisions are expressly involved in the court's reasoning processes.If the law can, amongst other things, be qualifi"d u, J culture of
argumentation, the debate on the best or most rational solution to
a legal dispute should expressly take prace by means of well-argued
and clearly expressed reasons (including a discussion of the ration-ality of relevant earlier decisions). There is in Belgium also a needfor a rational system of publishing court decisions.
5' Because court decisions can be irrational, it must be possibleto depart from them. However, the stability of the legJl order
makes it necessary to prevent just about every court decision from
being disregarded. Accordingly, the assessment of a court decisionwill need to amount to more than merery assessing it as to its fair-
ness or rationality : also factors such as legal certi,inty, procedurar
economy' reliance etc. should be assessed. the method'oi ma"ginu,l
assessment r introduced in this article should be capable of fit1ingin with this conception.

